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OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DISCRETE
SYSTEM DATA LINK ON AIR/GROUND
by
Ralph L. Grayson*
SUINARY
This study of ASRS reports suggest's that benefits should accrue from
implementation of DABS Data Link. The Phase I system's ETIS service is
expected to provide better terminal information than present systems by
improving currency and accuracy. In the exchange of air traffic control mes-
sages, discrete address insures that only the intended recipient will receive
and act on a specific message. Visual displays and printer copy of messages
should mitigate many of the reported problems associated with voice communi-
cations. The problems that would remain unaffected include error in address-
ing the intended recipient and messages.whose content is wrong but are other-
wise correct as to format and reasonableness.
INTRODUCTION
t
n
The study described in this report was an assessment of the Discrete
Address Beacon System (DABS) Data Link service. The results have shown that,
when implemented, the service may have a favorable effect on many of the com-
munications problems in the national aviation system. The assessment was
performed by research staff of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
program office at the request of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)**.
* Mr. Grayson, formerly automation officer of an FAA en route air traffic
control facility, is currently a Principal Research Scientist on the staff of
Battelle Columbus Laboratories assigned to the ASRS project research team.
** Letter, T. Kossiaras (FAA) to C. Billings (NASA) authorizing the instant
study effective May 2, 1979.
The stated objective was "to investigate issues and problems related to
verbal communications bei ;ween pilot and controller and other items of cockpit
information where application of data link services either as a supplement to
or in substitution for verbal communications is under development or con-
sideration." The investigation consisted of review and analysis of informa-
tion on verbal communications problems in 0-e ASRS database.
The ASRS database contains information from aviation occurrence reports
submitted voluntarily by pilots, controllers, and other participants in the
aviation system. The reports are sent to NASA's ASRS program office where
they are studied by aviation safety analysts and processed for entry into the
computerized dutabaLio. More than 20,000 reports; have been received. Many of
these describe problems in air/ground communications.
The assessment related to the currently projected design and usage of
DABS Data Link. Assumed system hardware capabilities were extrapolations of
the ETIS concept described by Wisleder* and abstracted in the Appendix to
this report. Essentially, the assumed system provides a ground sensor sta-
tion transmitting and receiving graphic messages to and from appropriately
equipped aircraft within range, utilizing a discrete beacon code for positive
identification of the communicating parties.
The Automated Traffic and Resolution System (ATARS) is an important
sub-system of DABS Data Link. It will maintain data on transponder-equipped
traffic within a given area and, through track analysis and course predic-
tion, determine if a collision hazard exists. Traffic advisory displays will
be presented and, if evasive action is required, will indicate flight paths
for separation. In the assessments made in this study, ATARS was assumed to
be an integral element of DABS Data Link system capability.
The .first stage of .field implementation of the system is now expected to
be the provision of terminal information in which the automation potential of
the, system will be utilized. This will be the "Enhanced Terminal Information
Nisleder, Robert W., May 1979, Enhanced Terminal Information Services
(ETIS) Utilizing the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) Data Link Concept
Description; draft report prepared by Transportation Systems  Center, Research
and Special Programs Administration, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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System" (ETIS) service in which the present ATIS information plus several
other parameters will be collected automatically and disseminated via data
link (see Appendix). The major effect of data link in this role will be the
elimination of the potential for human error in those classes of information
transfer susceptible to automation.
The succeeding stages of implementation are expected by the developers
to see DABS Data Link providing selected weather services on request and
being used in parallel with the present radio communication system as a means
of confirming the verbal messages being transmitted. In this role, data link
would provide redundancy in two ways: message duplication via a second
medium and message retention for subsequent reference. This dual system mode
of operation is expected to be long-term; it is unlikely that the entire avi-
ation system of communications will shift over entirely to data link in the
near future.
The ultimate implementation of data link may result in its becoming, the
primary medium fcr ATC communications for those aircraft suitably equipped.
In this role, full two-way communications would be ^mcomplished with data
link providing all .forms of information transfer required. in this case, the
voice communications system would be a supplement to data link providing
redundancy for emergency use and "fine tuning" of transmitted information.
APPROACH
A search was conducted among the 6,527 reports submitted to ASKS between
May 1, 1973 and August 31, 1979. The search technique identified and
retrieved reports concerning:
• Problems in voice communications between flight crew and
ATC
• Problems in conveying information in ATIS broadcasts (as
specified in the AIM and FAA ATC Handbook 7110.65A)
0 Problems with information concerning wind shear and
minimum safe altitude.
3
Of the original group of reports, 5,442 had been classified as cc
ing a message problem of some type fitting one of these criteria.
The research team studied selected report narratives to establi.
generic types of communications problems present. A categorization of
types was developed largely along lines already in use in classifying
report. Ten such categories emerged.
• Misinterpretable--Phonetic Similarity
• Inaccurate--Transposition
• Other Inaccuracies in Content
• Incomplete Content
• Ambiguous Phraseology
• Untimely Transmission
• Garbled Phraseology
• Absent--Nut Sent
• Absent--Equipment Failure
• Recipient Not Monitoring
The retrieved reports were grouped according to these categories. The
groupings were then further subdivided according to the operational regimes
in which the reported incidents occurred (i.e., terminal operations, en route
operations, and various special operations).	 Selections of these were
reviewed to determine unique characteristics and common features.
In the last stage of this study, the staff evaluated each type of com-
munications problem as to the effect on it of the developmental DABS Data
Link system. Four kinds of effects were considered.
• Eliminate--in practically all instances where a problem
of the type appeared it would have been precluded had a
data link been in operation.
• Mitigate--in many of the instances where a problem of the
type might have appeared it would have been precluded had
a data link been in operation.
• fiave no effect---in practically none of the instances
where a problem of the type might have appeared would the
presence of data link have affected the situation one way
or the other.
4
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9 Exacerbate--in most instances where the problem might
have appeared, the presence of an operating data link
would have made matters worse.
Also considered were problems in communications or procedures that 'might
be introduced by DABS Data Link. Qualitative conclusions relating to the
overall impact of the data link on communications problems emerged from the
above evaluations.
DISCUSSION
The initial pass over the database showed that most reports to ASRS (73
percent) involve some type of communication problem related to the operation
of an aircraft. Some reports describe more than one such problem. Thus,
there is plenty of evidence in the ASRS database pertinent to this study.
The nature of the problems reported varies widely covering a range from (a)
failure to originate an appropriate message to (b) failure of the intended
receiver to comprehend and/or confirm the message accurately. In many of
these cases;, it is evident without. exhaustive examination that data link
transmitta.is, by providing persistent visual portrayals of the messages,
might have prevented the problems (although possibly introducing others).
The discussions to follow examine several aspects of the effect of the
introduction of data link. First considered is the expectation problem --
the tendency of individuals to allow preconceptions to distort information
transferred to them. Second, the ubiquitous problem of transferring traffic
information effectively is discussed with special reference to the effect of
the ATARS feature. Next, the data link's effect on generic problems in the
origin and transmittal of messages is assessed. Following these sections,
the discussion moves on to consider several operational sectors of the "con-
trol information environment". This environment consists of information
transfer flows involving aircraft in three operations regimes: in or near
terminals, en route, and conducting various special operations such as mili-
tary training. In the case of terminal operations, the evaluation is concen-
trated on two separate asiiects: the providing of information about the ter-
minal area itself--the ETIS program --and the control of aircraft ground and
5
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pair movements in and near the terminal. Finally, the new problems that data
link might introduce are discussed.
The Expectation Problem
A study of ASKS reports indicates that many instances of misunderstand-
ing can be attributed to the expectation factor; the recipient (or listener)
perceives that he heard what tie expected to hear.. Pilots and controllers
alike tend to do this. Deviations from routine are not noted and the read
back is heard as the transmitted message, whether correct or incorrect.
"Aircraft A was in a block altitude of 12-14M. The
instructor pilot and the student both thought the con-
troller told them to turn left to a heading of 010
degrees and descend to and maintain 10,000 ft. At 10,700
ft the controller requested ACFT A's altitude. The crew
responded 10,700 ft. The controller stated the aircraft
had been cleared to ;2,000/ ft not 10,000 ft. 'There are
two contributing causes for this occurrence, 99 percent
of all clearances from that area are to descend to and
maintain 10,000. As the instructor I was conditioned to
descend to 10,000 by many previous flights. The con-
troller may have said 12,000 ft but I was programmed for
10,000 ft."
DABS Data Link will not eliminate the expectation factor, of course, but
the persistence of the visual message should result in better assimilation of
its content as well as providing a means for review during execution. This
may reduce substantially the number of incidents resulting from this source
of misunderstanding.
Traffic Avoidance Information Problems
ASR5 reports suggest that one of the least satisfactory aspects of
air/ground communications is the conveyance of traffic advisories and
avoidance information. Faults of all kinds are cited, but the pervasive dif-
ficulty that appears to underlie many of these faults is the seeming incon-
sistency with which traffic information is made available.
i
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In the present system, air traffic controllers 	 provide	 traffic
w	 *	 advisories as "an additional service", which means that, workload permitting,
	
the controller will issue advisories when not occupied with other duties. 	 #
R"	 Thus, a pilot may not get advisories during periods of high traffic activity i
and controller workload when the need for advisories may be the greatest.
Furthermore, it is most unlikely that a pilot will get an advisory on air-
'
	
	
craft not readily seen on radar -- especially those that are not operating a
transponder.
"While descending through 12,200 MSL first officer
observed and called traffic 12 O'C1ock level as we were
turning through 300 degrees. Turn was continued to
approximately 320 degrees and other aircraft diverged to
the left on a southeast heading with clearance of approx-
lmately 1,000 feet laterally. On inquiry, ATC indicated
Y that the only altitude readout on a target in that area
was 6,700 MSL. If our aircraft had not been turning in
i on heading approachng VOR, a projected collision course
would have resulted. Situation discussed with ATC super-
visor who indicated that a "skin paint" was later picked
up on other aircraft but later lost by adjacent center.
Other aircraft apparently operating without transponder
would be primarily cause of this incident. Contributing
would be difficulty in picking up front profile visually
at such closing speeds. other aircraft made no evasive
action and we assume he did not observe us."
9
Thy ATARS feature of the DABS Data Link system is expected to have a
favorable effect on communications by automating the detection of potential
conflict situations and then presenting the information to aircraft suitably
equipped. ATARS will track all transponder-equipped aircraft in the area of
coverage and compute conflict potentials between each aircraft pair (design
r capacity of the system under development presently is 7500 pairs at each
location). When a collision hazard is predicted, cockpit displays will indi-
cate the hazardous areas (from the perrpeetive of each individual aircraft)
and the evasive maneuvers best suited to eliminate the danger of a midair
collision.	 This information will be provided instantly and independently of
any controller workload priorities. As noted above, this service can be pro-
x.
	
	
vided via DABS Data Link only to aircraft equipped to receive the data. Con-
ceptually, the use of voice synthesizers for transmission of traffic
7
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advisories and evasive maneuvers could provide automated alert messages to
aircraft not equipped to receive ATARS.
Generic Message Problems
Thousands of ASRS reports cite the presence of difficulties in the
exchange of information through verbal messages. Some reports concern
transfer of information between ground facilities or personnel within such
facilities.
	
The greater number of reports concern air/ground communications
and a very small number concern air communications alone.
Air/ground communications are conducted by voice radio as they have been
for approximately fifty years. During that time technical advances have
improved the quality of voice transmissions and mitigated atmospheric or
induced electronic interference. Remaining technical problems include
blocked transmissions, line of sight limitations and hardware failures that
remain undiscovered until the next occasion for a communication--often
critical--arises. However, the retrieved. ASRS reports concerning problems in
air/ground communications indicate convincingly that the majority of such
problems involve human error.
These problems have been collected in the ten generic types listed pre-
viously. In the subsection discussions that follow, the possible effect of
the data link system on each type is assessed.
Misinterpretable--Phonetic Similarity
The "Phonetic Similarity" category was assigned when similar-sounding
names or numerics appeared to lead to confusion of meaning and/or intended
message recipient, thus causing an information transfer failure. A total of
71 reports were classified in this category. The following narrative is typ-
ical.
"We were cleared into position on Runway 32L for an
intersection takeoff. After a brief hold in position we
receive-. what I thought to be a takeoff clearance.	 I
nthen repeated 'Roger, ACR 122 cleared for takeoff,
straight out departure.' There was no response from the
tower until we were well down the runway approaching V1
speed.	 The tower controller then said rapidly, 'ACR 122
that clearance was not for yo ga, it was for ACR 142.' We
heard no other trip respond to the takeoff clearance but
possibly, we responded at the same time as ACR 142 so
that tower was unaware that we had both answered and
a	 blocked each other's response."
The majority of reported phonetic similarity problems involved execution
of clearances by someone other than the intended recipient. The discrete
address feature of Data Link should virtually eliminate this since only the
intended recipient will receive the message.
Inaccurate--Transposition
In the group of ASRS 'reports reviewed there were 85 in which some part
of the message was misunderstood because of a transmitted or recipient-
perceived mis-arrangement of numerical digits within the message. This type
of error seems to occur most often when ATC gives assigned headings or dis-
tances in conjunction with changes in assigned altitudes in the same clear-
ance. Heading 270 might be heard as a new assigned altitude. The readback
then might not be perceived (expectation factor) and an incident might
result. One ASRS report illustrates this problem.
"1:/0 flying-Capt working radio, center gave clearance to
descend, (either) (1) to cross 10 DME east at 240 or (2)
descend 24 DME east at 10, F/O set 10,000 ft alt and 24
DME, and started descent. Leaving 19,200 center advised
we should be at 240. Capt advised we shoe 10 at 24 DME,
but what altitude did lie want at this time, he then said
maintain 130."
While the accuracy of communications is totally dependent on accurate
content in the ortginal message, the visual presentation afforded by DABS
Data Link should virtually eliminate such gross transposition errors in	 mes-
sage
	 reception. More	 subtle errors such as hearing 253 instead of 235 are
less subject to correction by data link since: readers can make such tzanspo-
sittons
	
almost as	 readily	 as hearers.	 However,	 the fact that the message
«x , 9
^
•.	 . 	 cetir'x Mk ::ed W.YEt35et.:a:u+f'.^'
remains available fot re-checking should help reduce the effect of such tran-
spositions.
DABS Data Link should mitigate the problem of communications that are
inaccurate because of transposition.
Other Inaccuracies in Content
A total of 792 reports cited inaccuracies for reasons other than
phonetic similarity or transposition. Generally, they involved messages that
were accurately transmitted and received, but which contained, or were based
on, erroneous data (formulation errors), or, to a great degree, were the
results of errors of judgement in the originator's decision. This resulted
in the relatively large number of reports in this category.
"Faster Acft B was overtaking Acft A so I issued headings
that would provide lateral separation. Later Acft A
requested deviation around weather that I did not observe
oil Thinking that a route direct ABC would main-
tain lateral separation and . provide A with necessary
deviation, I issued the clearance. The clearance brought
A back south an.? since I only had five miles in the first
place, I immediately lost separation."
Other reports in this group reflect conflicts in the content of the mes-
sage between the sender and receiver where there is no plausible explanation
for the difference in understanding.
"Lift off Runway 31 climbing to 5000 per SID. On initial
contact flight was cleared to 12,000. Subsequent
transmission received and acknowledged to climb to 14,000
and maintain speed less than 250 knots until 1.3,000 or
above. Traffic was observed at one O'Clock on converging
course descending. When our flight left 13,000 ft depar-
ture control asked our altitude and advised us to descend
to 12,000 and increase speed.	 No member of the crew
either heard or acknowledged such a message."
Although one can only conjecture as to the cause of this incident, use
of DABS Data Link would probably have prevented it since written clearance
and new assigned altitude could be received only by the addressee and there
could be no question as to the stated altitude or speed instructions. Hard-
10
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copy printout in the cockpit, in addition to recorded computer data, would
verify what was transmitted. In addition, the newly assigned altitude would
appear in the full ATC data block providing additional redundancy.
With respect to the general problem of inaccuracies not stemming from
errors in originator judgement, use of DABS Data Link would prevent erroneous
receipt of clearances intended for another aircraft and provide graphic sym-
bology that can be re-read as required to decrease the probability of misin-
terpretation. This would be a considerable improvement over voice communica-
tions in accuracy and understanding.
Visual acknowledgement of message content would reduce readback require-
ments when DABS Data Link is used to confirm voice radio nissages. When air-
borne DABS Data Link equipment includes a printer, a permanent record of the
message received can be retained for reference or review.
It follows, however, that data link cannot eliminate the problem of mes-
sages that are "inaccurate" because the originator has erred in judgement and
therefore produced an incorrect message. As noted above, this is the problem
that accounted for the large number of reports classified in this category.
However, the system may provide some help. While it can transmit only the
information given it by the originator, reasonableness and eligibility checks
can be provided to preclude certain types of gross errors. Reasonableness
checks can determine whether an item falls within the range of possible
correct entries; eligibility checks can determine whether an affected air-
craft is under control of the position from which entries are transmitted.
Furthermore, with sufficient computer capacity it could be feasible to check
the results of an intended clearance amendment via software that would cause
an alert or reject message to be returned to the originator if the result
would be loss of separation.	 As heretofore discussed : the ATARS Program
would provide further redundancy to assure separation.
DABS Data Link should mitigate the inaccurate communications problem; it
wi11 help greatly where inaccuracies are caused by formulation errors :And may
provide some assistance through message checking where inaccuracies are
caused by originator judgement error.
11
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Incomplete Content
A reported problem communication was classified as "incomplete" when the
originator failed to provide all of the information necessary for the reci-
pient to understand it properly. There were 296 reports classified in this
category in the study group.
"Between LIT and FAM we were cleared for a Farmington
transition to 30L. To the best of both pilots' recollec-
tion, no statement was made by the controller to 'expect
a profile descent', when the clearance for a Farmington
transition was given. A flight was in the Farmington
area climbing to FL230. Upon hearing Acft B talking with
center, we volunteered our altitude as being FL240 and we
leveled off. I was watching B at FL230 and no evasive
action was required."
In this example the requirement for profile descent was not transferred
effectively, whether due to input error, failure to comprehend, or a failure
of the voice radio system. These failure causes are characteristic of the
reports in the "incomplete content" category. DABS Data Link would not, of
course, affect non-standard communications that are incomplete because of
input error. however, it appenrs that the latter two failure causes would be
mitigated with use of the system.
Ambiguous or Misleading Phraseology
A reported problem communication was classified as ambiguous or mislead-
ing if the composition, phraseology or presentation of the message was such
that the recipient would tend to misinterpret or misunderstand under normal
conditions of receipt. 529 reports indicated this type of message problem.
In the following example, a report oil situation rather than an occurrence,
the controller reporter points out an ambiguous communication dangerously
prevalent in aviation usage.
"Based oil past experiences as a pilot and a flight
instructor, I want to make a suggestion. In answer to
traffic advisories from a control facility I have heard
pilots reply with 'roger' which should never be permit-
ted. It would mein only that the pilot 'understood' but
12
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I have talked with our local controllers about this and
they (some at least) take it to mean 'traffic in sight'.
My suggestion is that controllers, Fed regulations, CADO,
flight instructors and all the Aviation Community with
all the power we can muster-require that proper words be
used when responding to traffic advisories. Airline
pilots are, in my opinion, just as guilty as general avi-
ation pilots. AIM says 'negative contact' and 'traffic
in sight' are proper responses.
Ambiguity should be virtually eliminated through use of preformed mes-
sages that would state clearly the action intended or the information being
provided. While standard terminology would apply to singular message entry,
the chance of ambiguity would be lessened by the vifsual and persistent nature
of the cockpit presentation.
Untimely Transmission
Messages were classified as untimely if they originated too late or too
early to be useful to the recipient. There were 710 reports that indicated
this message problem. The following is. an example of a traffic advisory that
was too late to avert a critical near midair collision.
"Departure clearance was left turn after takeoff to 120
degrees, climb and maintain 7000. We had ,just cleaned up
and finished the climb check list and at about 4500'
departure control gave us VFR traffic at 12 O'Clock less
than a mile. The cape spotted the traffic and pointed it
out to the F/0 who was flying and nosed the aircraft over
into level flight to go under Acft B 50 to 100 ft a.id
slightly behind him about. 100-200 ft. Acft B saw us just
before we passed under and behind him - he flinched just
enough to slightly raise his left wing. We feel that
radar should have had Acft B in radar contact at the time
we took off and we should have been advised of the
traffic at or before takeoff."
Aircraft H was evidently transponder-equipped, since lie was identified
unequivocally as VFR traffic by the departure controlle 	 9 this case,
ATARS might have provided more timely information to the crew enabling them
to avoid a very close encounter.
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Dispatching time limits designed into the system can ensure the timeli-
ness of automated message output. Thus, if the air traffic control system
fails to provide a traffic advisory at the appropriate time, the ATARS can
signal a safe alternative flight path. The system will, of course, have no
effect on messages whose dispatch is untimely because of originator judgement
error.
Garbled Phraseology
Messages were coded as being garbled if the information content was lost
or severely distorted so that recipient was unable to understand it. There
were 171 such reports in the study report group.
"Departed on Rtcnway 27 With a right turn to 300 degrees.
After takeoff the heading was amended to 330 degrees but
the transmission did not come through clear to us and it
was mistaken for 030 degrees. Subsequently we learned
that our readback to the controller was not received
clearly and it was assumed that we had received 330
degrees instead of what we interpreted to be 030 degrees.
Obviously, too much assumption, probably assisted by the
unusually clear weather. We later learned that our error
had brought us in conflict with Acf.t B that had taken off
immediately in front of us. Radar had us less than a
mile from Acft B when we passed."
Use of DABS Data Link should reduce this type of error by the clear
visual presentation of control instructions whose content can be retained for
review as necessary. This type of message problem is encountered often in
cases of frequency congestion; it is presumed this problem would not occur
with DABS Data Link.
Absent--Not Sent
Problem communications were assigned to the "absent--not sent" category
when there was a failure to originate or transmit a required or appropriate
message. In the study sample 1991 reports were classified in this message
problem subset. The large number is due to a broad interpretation that an
appropriate message would have broken the chain of events that resulted in a
14
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t	 hazardous occurrence. This could consist of either a point of information or
(] an air traffic control clearance. Many of these absent message were traffic
advisories not given because ATC either didn't see an aircraft or 'was too
busy ( see section on "Traffic Avoidance Information Problems"). The follow-
K ing example is a more subtle omission of an "Expect..." type of message.
"Runway 9R in use - (heading 120 and told to expect a new
!	 heading when in the air). The aircraft ahead of me was
issued right turn to 240 or 270. I was left on 120.
This heading aimed me toward Acft B and I felt very
uncomfortable. When tower did not give me an immediate
turn, I contacted departure radar expecting the other
turn. After radar contact was established, the departure
man asked me to go back to tower and upon returning he
(tower) told me I should have expected the second turn
from him. If tower had issued 'expect further clearance
a	 from him', it would have made this clear and concise."
The DABS Data Link system will not provide a solution to the problem of
a message missing because of originator oversight. It will eliminate the
problem with respect to those items of information that are automatically
transmitted by the system. Also, it is expected that the system will ease
communications workload, thereby lessening the problem of messages missing
because the originator doesn't have time to dispatch them.
Absent--Equipment Failure
Problem communications fell in the the category "absent--equipment
failure" when a failure caused a complete loss of the message. The study set
contained 153 such reports. This finding suggest that the equipment in use
is reliable when compared to the human error-initiated problems in message
transfer that are reported to ASKS.
"Acft A and Acft B were being vectored to Detroit Metro
airport by approach control. Acft C was being vectored
to Willow Run airport on the same frequency. The micro-
phone button became stuck on C. As a result the approach
control^er was unable to communicate with A or B and less
than standard separation occurred. The two aircraft were
within approximately 500 ft vertically, the pilot of B
called the tower Controller and advised there was a stuck
mike oil 	 control. The tower controller, using
15
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the information on his radar display, attempted to des-
cend and turn B to avoid the confliction. However, the
situation had deteriorated to the point that the conflic-
tion could not be avoided. Acft B apparently took
evasive action."
Loss of communication is an extremely frustrating experience for an air
traffic controller. He is usually helpless to take action to preclude a
hazardous consequence. In the above example, one pilot had the presence of
mind to contact the tower after noting the approach control frequency was
blocked due to the stuck mike, but it was too late to avoid loss of separa-
tion.
DABS Data Link would provide a communication channel less susceptible to
the "stuck mike" condition. In the event of data link communication loss the
redundancy of the voice channel would provide a back-up. One aircraft with
an equipment problem such as the one depicted above would be less prone to
jeopardize other aircraft under common control. It is unlikely that :data
link could fail with the transmit mode "on" (like a stuck mike) since the
system's software provides, among other fail-safe features, a length limit
within which a message must be transmitted or the transmitter is turned off
and failure signals are sent to the operating position.
DABS Data Link can reduce this type of problem in either the primary
communication mode or as the alternate or back-up means. In any event, it
and the voice communication system would complement one another.
Since it is anticipated that a large number of messages will be gen-
erated through automation, these instances, as in the foregoing example,
should be greatly reduced. A failure of automation equipment would result in
an absent message in the same manner as the human failure to originate or
transmit the message. However, the redundancy provided by the unsuccessful
message transmission alert should result in improvement over the present Sys-
tem.
16
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As discussed earlier, the ATARS feature would provide a further back-up
in those cases where a conflict avoidance message is not transmitted for any
reason.
In summary, it is difficult to estimate the degree to which DABS Data
Link might ease indirectly the equipment failure problem in air/ground com-
munications but it can, of course, have no direct effect on the reliability
of communications equipment.
a
Recipient Not Monitoring
M
A problem communication was placed in the "recipient. not monitoring"
category if the recipient failed to maintain listening watch, proper lookout,
or failed to read available correct information. There were 553 reports in
this classification.
"A confliction occurred between Acft A on my frequency
and Acft B on approach control frequency. A was depart-
ing and B was arriving. I was not aware that the B
flight was in the area and the confliction was first
noted by an approach controller who must have seen what
happened. An investigation followed showing that the
approach controllers who had handed off A to me failed to
coordinate all aspects of control to me as per letter of
agreement between our facilities, and I failed to catch
the mistake when A came on my frequency. Poor coordina-
tion between controllers and not properly listening to
the pilot's initial contact were contributing factors in
this incident."
A substantial number of reports in this category described the results
of traffic advisories not being issued when the reporter alleged or inferred
that the traffic could and should have been seen on radar. It m~,y be techni-
cally correct that a specific target was not seen due to inattention to the
a
particular area in question and, therefore, the area was not being monitored
by the radar controller. It appears, howver, that many pilots expect traffic
advisories at all times if they have been advised that they are in radar con-
T	
tact.	 The ATARS feature should provide improvement in this type of problem
x^
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both by providing advisory information on a more dependable basis and by pro-
viding evasive-maneuver advice.
Another variant of this problem is failure of flight crew or controller
to receive a message or initial broadcast or to respond to a call when time
is critical. In some reported cases the controller has become aware that his
original plan for providing separation was ineffective and he has attempted
to correct the situation at the last moment. Lack of instantaneous response
gives rise to the allegation that a proper moistening watch wasn't being main-
tained.
Failure to monitor can still occur with DABS Data Link if cockpit dis-
traction or inattention results in failure to heed an incoming message. A
message waiting alert could be used to attract attention to an unacknowledged
message, but instances could still arise when other events in flight might
preclude ready response.
Message Problems Summary
Table 1 is a summary of the conjectured impact of DABS Data Link on the
various problem categories in the ASKS database relate to the present
reports. In none of the cases would the problem type be worsened. In most
cases, data link is expected to mitigate communications problem; it should
eliminate two of the problem types.
Terminal Information Problems
This evaluation relates to the proposed Phase I DABS Data Link service
described in the reference listed on the First page of this report and in the
Appendix. It is a noteworthy feature of the service that most of the infor-
mation to be provided by ETIS will be automated and provided on a real time
basis with the scan rate of the instruments being the only effective limiting
factor on currency of the information transmitted. Automated instrument
readings would provide either direct or indirect input to the DABS sensor
resulting in timely transmission of such pertinent information as wind
1%,	 18
lTABLE 1. IMPACT OF DABS DATA LINK AN MESSAGE PROBLEMS
Problem
Code
No. of
Reports Eliminate Mitigate Exacerbate
No
Impact
Phonetic Similarity 71 X
Transposition 85 X
Other Inaccuracies 792 X
Incomplete 196 X
Ambiguous 529 X
Untimely 710 X
Garbled 171 X
Absent 1991 X
Equipment Failure 153 ? ?
Not Monitoring 553 X
Notes Above evaluations assume the availability of ATARS subsystem with both
visual display and automated voice transmission capability.
direction and velocity, visibility, precipitation, and similar data during
the approach and landing phase. Departure ETIS data would be provided in the
same manner, limited to the items required for that phase of flight.
There are, however, three items that would require manual intervention;
these involve specific changes initiated by human decision making, i.e., (1)
changes of runways in use, (2) changes of instrument approach procedure, and
(3) airport advisories. Since the first two normally occur simultaneously, a
single act of intervention should be sufficient. Through the use of coded
entries, a single input would cause update messages to be generated and
transmitted to all who have a need for the information. This would normally
include all aircraft that had received the standard initial arrival ETIS
information.
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Communications Problems Affected by ETIS
The database was searched for report concerning (1) items o: information
contained in the present ATIS,* (2) broadcast problems with ATIS, and (3)
indications of both a communication message problem and at least one item of
either ATIS or the proposed ETIS information. In addition, reports concern-
ing wind shear and minimum safe altitude warning were identified.
An interesting finding of this search was that only a few of the message
problem reports were concerned with terminal information services; 50 such
reports were retrieved. It had been expected that a large number of reports
would describe difficulty in understanding the ATIS broadcasts. Although a
considerable number of such reports was received early in the period of ASRS
operations (1976 and early 1977), receipt had dwindled to a small rate during
the search period on which this study is based. This suggests that improve-
ments have been made in response to several FAA directives aimed at poorly
prepared ATIS tapes, use of excessively rapid rates of speech, and technical
problems with ATIS' broadcast equipment. it may also suggest that airmen may
judge difficulty in understanding ATIS to be a minor matter easily overcome
by repeating the broadcast and therefore not worthy of an ASRS report. In
any case, the majority of terminal information-related reports described
problems with ATIS that had substantially more serious consequences than
listening to a broadcast a second or third time.
The problems present in the terminal information segment of the
retrieved reports fell into a 4-stage classification.
1. Unintelligible Transmissions
2. Obsolete Approach/Runway-in-Use Information
3. Non-Current Runway Visibility Readings
4. Obsolete Weather Information
*Automated 'Terminal Information System. Items of information included in
these broadcasts are specified in the Airman's Information Manual and the FAA
,fir Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65A.
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In addition, the data suggested that the ETIS concept, in mitigating the
above problems, might introduce at least one problem not present in the avia-
tion system now; this will be discussed in a separate section.
Unintelligible transmission. 	 -	 Reporters
	
have	 cited
	 difficulty	 in
comprehension	 of	 the ATIS broadcast due to the rapid rate of speech and the
poor quality of the recording.
"On a VFR flight to ICT late in October, I had to
	 listen
to	 the	 ATIS	 seven	 times	 to	 get active runway, wind,
altimeter setting because of the rate the words were spo-
ken,	 too	 fast.	 As a low time pilot my workload landing
at an unfamiliar airport is higher 	 than	 it	 should	 be,
check and double check everything and it is unsettling to
be unable to get the
	
information	 needed.	 Most	 places
I've	 been	 that	 use	 ATIS, Chicago, Milwaukee, Madison,
Rockford, it seems that making	 the	 tape	 has	 become	 a
chore so it reads as fast as possible to get it over."
"ATIS is supposed to speed up and facilitate arrivals and
departures at airports large enough to warrant its
installation. This is a wonderful concept. However, on
the times that I have been into airports that have it
(Boise and Portland) the repQrt has been so distorted as
to be all but useless. There is no need for the person
recording the information to speak as fast as he can. I
do not believe that I should have to listen to ATIS more
than three times at the most to have all the information
straight. once should be sufficient. But I have had to
listen five minutes or more before I was able to clearly
understand what it is the man is actually saying.
Without exception, I have not been able to clearly under-
stand the content of the ATIS broadcast the first time
simply because the man spoke too fast, and for the lack
of a better word, mumbled as lie talked."
The basic problem here is garbled message transmission. As pointed our
previously in the DISCUSSION sectton of this report, data link will virtually
eliminate this type of problem in whatever context it appears because the
information will be presented visually in an orderly format.
a
Obsolete ATIS data-approach/runway in use. - A frequent complaint from
reporters is a change of approach and/or active runway from that given in the
ATIS broadcast received by the reporter.
21
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"Planned apr and Lndg for Runway 31R JFK. Prior to turn-
ing final runway was changed to 22L and Acft was vectored
for ILS or visual apr to Rwy 22L. Visibility approx 5 mi
smoke and haze. Our aeft was advised being vectored for
22L ILS apr to advs when Rwy in site.	 Throughout the
'
	
	
vector until turning on final we received the 13L ILS
identification (IMOH). Both 22L and 31R share a common
s freq 110.9. We reported this to apch control and were
advised the ILS was operating normally on 22L. Not until
we were established on visual apch for 22L did the ILS
start operating normally with current ident. At this
time twr advised that 22L ILS was now operating normally.
Not serious in VFR but could be very confusing and possi-
bly cause missed apch in IFR."
Under the ETIS concept runway changes would be disseminated to all air-
craft that had previously received "Initial Arrival Information". An update
message would be transmitted automatically via DABS Data Link. Coded entries
would update the computer data to the new runway configuration. Controller
workload would be substantially less than that for update of the ATIS broad-
cast tape and the pilot would receive immediate notification of the change in
the approach procedure.
Runway visibility readings. - Rapidly changing runway visibility read-
ings (RVR) result in both frequency congestion and cockpit distraction at the
most critical time in the execution of an instrument approach. Since RVR is
not transmitted unless the approach is being conducted in near minimum
weather conditions, it is a serious distraction using voice transmissions in
the present system. In other cas_. the RVR appears to have been omitted or
the reading was not accurate when it could have been very valuable to the
pilot on approach.
"Flight making ILS approach crossing outer marker, tower
reported heavy rain at airport. Speed and rate along
with localizer and glide slope all were normal throughout
approach. Sighted approach lights at 400 ft and began
encountering light rain at 300 ft. Runway was In sight
and just at touchdown encountered a wall of hard rain and
had no forward visibility. I could see by the center
line that we were going off the left side of the runway.
We soon felt our left main gear was in the lights or pos-
sibly off to the left side of the runway. We continued
forward velocity for about 1000 ft when we again regained
forward visibility at which time the captain was able to
22
d
^t
3 i
=	 bring the aircraft back over the runway and bring it to a 	 r
stop."
Had DABS Data Link been available to automatically relay the detailed
and apparently rapidly changing RVR to the flight crew, they could have been
forewarned of the sharply reduced visibility beyond the touchdown point.%
{
obsolete weather information. -• Availability of automated weather
observation equipment with input to DABS sensors can overcome the problem of
currency in the ATIS which results in transmission of obsolete weather infor-
mation.
I	 '
"Approach was made VFR--on short final encountered rain
y (which we thought was light because tower had not
reported any). Rain was heavier than anticipated.	 Nor-
I mal touchdown--wind from left which was not reported blew
us from runway because of hydroplaning. Aircraft came to
a stop just off side of Runway 7R.
Precipitation detection equipment and wind measuring devices could bave
precluded this incident by provision of timely information to the pilot.
In another report the wind shear factor in addition to the obsolescence
of the ATIS information proved to be a problem.
"Several aircraft reported moderate to severe turbulence
on final approach to the tower. Flight crew monitored
apch control and departure control frequencies while
waiting for takeoff. To my knowledge arriving aircraft
were not advised of "wind shear"/turbulence/airspeed
excursions. After our takeoff at 1655 I checked arrival
ATIS--no mention of approach difficulties--in fact info
was 50 minutes old despite reported hook cloud classi-
cally displayed on radar to the SW. I advised local ops
of wind problems reported on final, suggesting they
advise pilots in range and that MIA dispatch also be
advised--that evening about 6 tornadoes hit central CA
„A	including extensive tornado damage to Forest 	 Park.
t	 Arriving A/C seemed to be left out of the information
loop."
23
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DABS Data Link transmission of pertinent weather changes and alerts to
possible wind shear conditions could have provided real time information as
to current weather and changes that were occurring during a period of great
instability. The workload imposed on terminal facilities during thunderstorm
activity often results in failure to update the ATIS tape or to provide ade-
quate weather information as reported. Automated instrumentation to provide
thunderstorm warning and advice of movement in addition to "wind shear"
alerts can provide valuable and timely data to the cockpit allowing improved
decision-making based on current and accurate information.
Terminal Operations Problems
The terminal operations evaluation concerned impact of DABS Data Link on
communications problems encountered where aircraft under ATC control are per-
forming surface movements or flight operations in the airport traffic area.
Surface Operations
ASKS reports demonstrate the presence of two main types of communica-
tions problems related to surface operations: clearance misinterpretations
leading to active runway incursions and failures to communicate taxi routes
to preclude wrong turns and consequent ground conflicts.
"ATIS was received advising departures on Runway 4,
arrivals to Runway 31. Cleared to Runway 4. We switched
to tower and advised we were ready for takeoff. The
tower said, 'Taxi up to but hold short', which 1st off-
icer acknowledged, but I thought the tower said, 'Taxi
into position and hold'. I assumed the traffic was land-
ing on Runway 31. As I took the runway, I looked to my
left and noticed an aircraft on about a 3 mile final.
The error was caught by me, the tower, and the first off-
icer at the same instant. The tower advised I was sup-
posed to hold short. I immediately cleared the runway
well before the traffic landed. Factors% which I think
contributed were tower deviating from the ATIS informa-
tion and then not specifically advising us. I have
become accustomed to holding in position while an air-
craft lands on another runway, and, we are creatures of
habit and I thought I heard something I obviously
didn't."
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YMany runway incursion problems appear to result from a flight crew's
acting on a clearance onto the runway or for takeoff intended for another
aircraft. This occurs most often because of phonetic similarity of call
signs or crew predisposition--expectancy. As discussed previously, the
discrete address feature of the data link system should eliminate the
a
phonetic similarity problem.
	 While the expectancy factor would still be
present, premature movement is less likely to occur since the clearance would
t^U
4 not be transmitted until it was to be acted upon; when transmitted, it would
be seen only by the intended recipient. As is true in every case, erroneous
input that passes reasonableness checks could result in an error. It appears
that the number of unauthorized runway incursions could be greatly reduced.
fikk
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The taxi problem is most often related to flight crew unfamiliarity with
airport layout, repairs, and changes; communications problems tend to be
secondary.
Might Operations--Airport Traffic Area
The airport traffic area is the scene of many reported system irregular-
{ ities. Prominent among these are traffic conflicts with aircraft that are
unknown or not properly in the pattern or approach/departure paths, traffic
conflicts due to sequencing disorders, use of wrong runways, and deviations
from intended aircraft trajectory (course, speed, altitude) during approach
or departure phases of flight. The role of communications problems in caus-
ing these conflicts is varied but is important in each class.
Conflicts with unknown aircraft. - ASRS reports describe conflicts of
this type often occurring when controllers are unaware of the traffic or are
too busy to issue advisories. These situations fall under the general head-
N	 ings of absent or untimely communications problems.
"At about the 43 DNfE fix from XY7. we were cleared to con-
tact	 approach	 127.9. At	 the	 same time we contacted
approach we witnessed an airplane pass within 300
	
ft	 of
our	 right	 side.	 When asked about the traffic approach
replied he was 'too busy' to call
	 it out.	 The	 flight
engineer	 was	 the	 first crew member to see conflicting
traffic.	 First officer was flying and rapt	 was	 tuning
s
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the radios. The flight engineer called traffic to first
officer. Traffic was too close to take evasive action.
First officer identified aircraft. Upon interrogation on
127.9 approach identified the aircraft as squawking 1200
and an altitude readout of 14,500 ft.
In this example, DABS Data Link might have provided some improvement by
a general reduction of the controller communications workload. Whether or
not this will happen is dependent on system design and input requirements.
If lengthy and complex keyboard entries are required, there may be little
reduction in overall workload. However, for routine pilot/controller commun-
icacions, it appears that computer-generated outputs can be sent with minimal
coded entries at least as economically as is done with the current. computer-
ized systems.
Another improvement would be the availability of ATARS to provide timely
warning and avoidance maneuver information with respect to those aircraft in
the area that are equipped with transponders. The DABS Data Link system will
have no effect on the problem of unidentified, non-transponder-equipped air-
craft.
Sequencing disorders. - Examination of ASRS reports shows that sequenc-
ing disorders and their consequent traffic conflicts most frequently are
caused by errors in a controller's planning and/or judgement of traffic spac-
ing. Communications problems enter the picture significantly, however, a fre-
quent type of occurrence being the taking of a sequencing control message by
an aircraft other than the i.ntended recipient. DABS Data Link's discrete
address feature should virtually eliminate this as a source of sequencing
difficulties. The tendency to misinterpret or garble such messages is also
present and should be overcome by the clarity and referrability of data link
information. A possible problem introduced by the data link with reference
to sequencing is that the discrete address feature will deny pilots the
"party line" information which they now routinely use to form a mental pic-
ture of the overall traffic situation in which they are dynamic participants.
The "party line" aspect of the data link system is discussed as a separate
issue later in this report.
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Runway assignment errors.	 - Use of the wrong runway for landing or tak-
ing off is a frequently reported airport traffic area problem.	 In most cases
the fault is a communications problem.	 Most of the problems 	 involve	 flight
crew misinterpretation of the landing or takeoff clearance--sometimes in con-
nection with a last-minute change in the runway assignment.
"Visibility	 estricted but	 FR.	 Acft A reported	 4	 mile
 r	 V	
final	 for	 runway 9, Acft B on right base for runway 12,
Acft C was in position for departure at threshold of run-
' way	 9,	 Acft	 D	 was	 holding	 midfield on taxiway E for
g departure on runway 9, Acft D was instructed to turn left
heading	 360 and cleared for takeoff.	 Instead of depart-
' ing runway 9, Acft A started takeoff 	 roll	 westbound	 on
runway 27 toward Acft C and Acft A. 	 He was inst ructed to
t abort and stopped on the runway."
The communications errors leading to these problems consist of phonetic
similarity, transposition, inaccuracy, ambiguity, garbling, and untimeliness.
The expected impact of DABS Data Link on each of these problem types has
already been discussed. In summary, it can be expected that the data link
system would help to eliminate flight crew misinterpretation of runway
assignments
r
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Deviations from aircraft intended trajectory.	 - ASRS reports record
many instances of aircraft departing from assigned altitudes or headings dur-
ing approaches or departures in airport traffic area airspace. Communica-
tions problems are an important factor in such trajectory deviations, sharing
the burden of causation with poor flying technique on the part of flight
f crew The majority of the communications problems involved misunderstood
clearances; failures to issue appropriate clearances and failures to change
frequencies properly also accounted for a significant number of the devia-
tions. It is noteworthy that altitude deviations predominated in this fault
category.	 The data link system should minimize problems with misunderstood
clearances through persistent visual portrayal of the message. Alerts to
controllers could be provided to indicate the optimum point for a clearance
to be issued to arriving aircraft to permit use of the most desirable descent
7.
	
profile.	 Further, it is within the capability of the system to permit the
automation of the frequency change process. 	 This would largely eliminate
s^
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control problems arising from human errors in performing this step. Communi-
cation channels would be selected by airborne microprocessor/servo systems
controlled by data transmitted via DABS Data Link. Channel changes would
then be initiated by the airspace and planned flight path being used by the
aircraft or manually initiated by the controller.
En Route Operations Problems
The en route operations evaluation concerned impact on communications
problems encountered where aircraft under ATC control are cruising en route
or transitioning to or from the cruise condition. Many of the problems aris-
ing in this flight regime are traceable to difficulties of ATC coordination
within and between control facilities. Most of the problems relatable to
difficulties in air to ground communication were of three types: altitude
deviations, failures of flight crews to respond effectively to clearance
amendments for conflict avoidance, and a variety of difficulties related to
weather avoidance.
Altitude Deviations
One. of the more serious incidents with great potential for mishap is an
aircraft being at other than the altitude assigned by air traffic control.
This is especially serious when an ltitude restriction has been issued dur-
ing climb or descent. Restrictions are issued because of conflicting traffic
and failure to comply will usually result in loss of separation.
Altitude deviations occur for several reasons. These continents will
address those embedded in the message problems previously discussed. DABS
Data Link will provide a visual presentation of the assigned altitude and
intermediate altitude restrictions that can be reviewed as necessary. This
should mitigate those deviations arising from failure in message transfer.
A frequently reported occurrence is altitude overshoot due to a cockpit
distraction, failure to set the altitude alert properly, or failure to heed
the aural or visual signals provided by the alert system.
	
These problems
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would not be affected directly by DABS Data Link since, in most cases, the
i	 correct data was received in the message transfer.
DABS Data Link should improve the accuracy of cockpit altitude data han-
dling and reduce the frequency of altitude deviations.
Clearance Amendment Response
The previous discussion is applicable to any change in air traffic con-
trol clearances. A clear and readily understood messge that is not affected
by frequency congestion and is transferred as a high priority message will
improve clarity and speed, and, since it will be addressed only to the
intended recipient, there could be a more timely response. Numerical values,
such as altitude and heading assignments, should be readily assimilated,
assuming no error in the assignment process and subsequent input.
"Air line crew received a clearance for descent and read
back 10000 feet. Crew descended to 10000 and controller
asked crew to verify maintaining 11000. Crew responded
negative and controller asked them to climb immediately
to 11000 and gave them an evasive turn away from other
traffic at 10000.
	
ATC said the clearance issued was
11000 but the crew heard and read back 10000."
This misunderstanding could have been prevented with DABS Data Link pro-
vided correct input was made.
t
Weather Avoidance
Avoidance of fronts and thunderstorms is a	 major	 factor	 in	 en	 route
' operations. Deviations from planned routes becomes commonplace and there are
frequent incidents involving uncoordinated penetration of	 airspace	 assigned
to	 another	 aircraft or to a different air traffic controller.	 This problem
will not diminish with DABS Data Link except for the general	 improvement	 in
message transfer.
Weather displays in the cockpit can be improved through CRT presentation
via	 data link of National Weather Service radar data with color coded inten-
4-
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sity levels. Availability of such data could be very helpful, particularly
if observation of more than one site can be made available. Flight paths can
be chosen based on real time evaluation of long range weather patterns in
addition to the limited and close range data provided by airborne radar.
Special Operations Problems
Most special operations such as military training or testing of experi-
mental aircraft are non-routine and require scheduling and advance notifica-
tion to assure their safe isolation from routine aviation activity. A
variety of communications problems are associated with them.
• Military Training Routes. A large number of ASRS reports
describe close encounters between military aircraft
operating on low altitude training roues and civil air-
craft near those routes. The associated FSS provides
advisories on military training.
• Aircraft Test Operations. These are normally conducted
in designated areas but reports indicate two problems.
First, the test aircraft may inadvertently fly outside
the special use area. Second, other aircraft may
penetrate the test airspace due to failure to contact ATC
or disregard for the hazard potential in such areas.
• Helicopter operations. Some reports to ASKS cite hel-
icopter operations as being hazardous to fixed wing
operation when the same airspace is used by both types.
Other reports by helicopter pilots cite the danger
imposed by high performance fixed wing aircraft since the
speed differential makes evasive action difficult.
• Parachute Activities. Sky diving and parachute jumping
are normally conducted in designated areas during regular
time periods. Some reports cite such activities when
there is no available information or routine inquiry.
Changes of schedules, failure to maintain schedule,
failure of interfacility coordination, or failure of
pilots to obtain available information can result in a
surprise experience.
X.
Information concerning military training routes, aircraft test opera-
tions, helicopter operations, and parachute activities is presently made
available through Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS) or advisories via voice radio.
Current NOTAMS could be made available upon request via DABS Data Link
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providing reliable dissemination assuming that the current correct informa-
tion is entered into the appropriate database.
It would be possible to transmit applicable notices automatically based
on the route being flown. If the flight path of the aircraft was projected
to enter an area where the notice is applicable, it could be transmitted via
DABS Data Link.
Overseas Operation
Communication problems in overseas operations are cited in some report
with lack of radar coverage being a primary complaint by air traffic con-
trollers. Separation standards are large due to the foregoing limitations.
These problems will not be aKfected by DABS Data Link, using present VHF
transmission links, but there may be potential for its use in conjunction
with satellite communication systems and navigation satellite systems in the
future..
Law Enforcement
Use of the discrete address feature can provide for communications with
aircraft involved in law enforcement activities without interception by oth-
ers on the standard frequencies for DABS Data Link.
Emergencies
Since there is no "typical" emergency, the application of DABS Data Link
would depend on the gravity and the nature of the emergency. Loss of radio
communications has been discussed previously; data link would provide a
back-up channel. If an airborne emergency required the transmission of com-
plex instructions for remedial action, the printer copy via data link would
be an improvement over verbal communications.
Problems Introduced by raABS
Data Link Implementation
While it appears that there will be substantial benefit from the imple-
mentation of DABS Data Link, some negative effFacts must be considered.
Visual Reference to Cockpit Displays
Since the output of DABS Data Link in the cockpit is projected to be a
CRT display with a printer hard copy option, it will be necessary for pilots
or flight crewmembers to make visual reference to the output copy to receive
messages. This will prevent scanning of the surrounding airspace to observe
other traffic in the area during the time required to assimilate the data
link message. In addition, the visual system must re-adjust when outside
scanning is resumed. This could result in failure to observe other traffic
in sufficient time to avoid a hazardous situation.
ATARS may reduce this problem by providing positive location information
on other aircraft as well as evasive maneuver data. An alternate display
system might utilize synthesized voice messages to single-pilot aircraft
either in parallel or as a supplement to the visual displays.
Elimination of the Party Line Concept
A popular point of view among pilots is that there is substantial bene-
fit in the "party .line" concept: monitoring of a communication frequency can
provide useful information on traffic flow, location of other traffic, etc.
Many pilots make extensive use of the party line, particularly at non-
controlled airports or lower-activity terminals served by a control tower.
"I was in Acft A cleared through the airport traffic area 	 f
at 2500 MSL. While passing over the field, I heard the
tower clear Acft B for takeoff on 31L. He was to climb
	 x',
to 300 MSL on a 270 deg heading. I kept looking, but was
unable to see him. The tower never did advise me he was
coming. At approx 6 miles west I saw him as he climbed
out from under my left wing. He was traveling extremely
fast and passed about 200 to 300 feet from me."
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Some pilots contend that this is the usual means of acquiring a mental
picture of the current traffic situation.
The beneficial use of party line is described in several ASKS reports
but in a way only incidental to the primary occurrence since almost all
reports concern an unsafe incident or condition. This report is an illustra-
tion:
"I was descending to 1500 MSL in Acft A and had been told
to enter left downwind for Runway 05, approaching the
p airport from the northwest. Acft B had just departed
Runway 05 and asked for a left turnout to the northwest.
The tower approved and said, 'No reported traffic.'.
Immediately,- I began looking and saw him approaching me
on a collision course. Evasive action was required on my
part. Acft B passed my right wing less than a mile. I
don't think he ever saw me, because the tower had told
him there was no traffic NW of the airport."
The fact that the discrete address feature will eliminate party line
among aircraft equipped with DABS Data Link may be considered a disadvantage
by many in the aviation community. However, in connection with this per-
ceived disadvantage, several aspects• of the party line concept should be
examined further.
f
	
	
Party line effectiveness must be evaluated in terms of the number of
aircraft on a common frequency that are pertinent to the traffic situation.
A In large terminals, approach control is sectorized, local control is some-
times divided by the runways in use, ground control is split, and departing
aircraft may still be in terminal airspace after being changed to center fre-
quency.	 In addition, civil aircraft utilize VHF frequencies while military
'
	
	 aircraft are normally equipped for UIIF communications only; therefore, only
the ATC transmissions can be heard on the paired frequency and then only if
`. the controller is transmitting simultaneously on VHF and UHF. Frequency mon-
itoring may include only a fraction of the traffic that could be involved in
an incident.
Errors can result from misunderstanding of an overheard transmission. A
pilot may initiate an action based on his perception of the message content.
r.
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Some ASRS reports concern pilots acting on a clearance heard on party line
but intended for another aircraft.
"Acft A was told to taxi into position and hold on Runway
35 while Aeft B was on landing rollout. Acft C was told
to taxi into position and hold on Runway 23 behind Acft
D. Acft B, landing on Runway 33, was holding short of
Runway 23. When Acft B turned off Runway 33 and Acft D
rolled past the intersection of Runways 23 and 33, Acft a
was told to turn right heading 090 after departure,
cleared for takeoff. Acft C (holding on Runway 23)
thought the clearance was for him and started takeoff
roll. Acft A was rolling also. The local controller did
not hear Acft C acknowledge for the takeoff clearance nor
did he see Acft C start takeoff roll until it was too
late. Acft A and Acft C missed by approximately 200 feet
at the intersection.$'
Party line is capable of making additional information available. The
relative position and flight path of other aircraft can often be ascertained
even when not in view. The intentions of other pilots may be overheard and
taken into account in planning future courses of action. 	
-ft''
If replacement of this party line information is not provided, there
could be justifiable concern among pilots. ATARS, however, may provide an
effective presentation of pertinent traffic since it would not be dependent
on voice frequency assignment. In addition, it will indicate avoidance
maneuvers that take into account all traffic. Since ATARS provides collision
avoidance direction in addition to traffic information it may prove to be
superior to party line in providing pertinent, accurate, and timely informa-
tion to the pilot.
Mixed Capabilities During Transition Period
It is anticipated that many aircraft will not be e q uipped for full util-
ization of the DABS Data Link system for several years. High performance
aircraft and newer production models may be equipped during the early period
of availability.
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Mixed capabilities of aircraft impose an additional workload on the air
a	 traffic control system. The need to consider the varied equipment aboard and
the applicable procedures certainly increases the probability of human error.
I
Aircraft Retrofit
Many egrrent aircraft have crowded cockpit instrumentation. Major
redesign may be necessary to provide for installation of DABS display equip-
ment. More will be needed than simply placing a new box in a vacant area.
Current wide body aircraft appear to have space available that can accommo-
date the equipment.	 M
Training Requirements
Specific training would be necessary for users of the DABS Data Link
system. Final equipment design would determine some of the requirements such
as formats and use of quick action messages. User tests of equipment may be
necessary. Air traffic controller training requirements appear to be more
extensive than those for pilot/flight crew.
Problems Unchanged by DABS Data Link
Erroneous inputs that are reasonable in their format and content would
remain an inherent problem. Some protection against mechanical errors in the
input process can be afforded by validity checks that cause gross errors to
fi
be rejected as in the case in the present ATC system.
Errors in the decision process would be unchanged by the availability of
DABS Data Link. Insofar as the input meets validity criteria the system
would be incapable of assessing the correctness or the relative merit of
decisions unless their implementation would result in one of the alert condi-
tions such as minimum safe altitude warning.
A
Hardware failure should be relatively infrequent with state of the art
electronics, but system redundancy is the only back-up for a major hardware
L'
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rproblem. The low cost and small size of microprocessors should permit a very
high level of reliability through component redundancy, but the ultimate
failure of hardware would still render the system unusable.
SUMMARY
This study of ASKS reports suggests that benefits should accrue from
implementation of DABS Data Link. The Phase I system's ETIS service is
expected to provide better terminal information than present systems by
improving currency and accuracy. In the exchange of air traffic control mes-
sages, discrete address insures that onl y the intended recipient will receive
and act on a specific message. Visual displays and printer copy of messages
should mitigate many of the reported problems associated with voice communi-
cations. The problems that would remain unaffected include error in address-
ing the intended recipient and messages whose content is wrong but are other-
wise correct as to format and reasonableness.
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APPENDIX
ETIS CONCEPT
The ETIS concept describes a means whereby various terminal	 information
services are	 provided to pilots via the DABS data link.	 It consists of the
following elements:
1. A set of	 terminal	 information	 services	 consisting	 of
various messages containing weather data, airport status,
alerts, and other advisories of benefit to a 	 pilot,	 and
dispatched	 in	 accordance	 with	 the requirements of the
different phases of flight in the terminal area.
2. Hardware at airports to	 collect	 and	 input	 ETIS	 data,
including	 interfaces	 with	 weather	 sensor	 systems,
displays,	 input	 terminals	 and	 associated	 processing
equipment, and communication links.
3. Software resident in the DABS data link applications pro-
cessor
	
(AP)	 at the controlling ATC facility to generate
messages,	 process input data, handle requests, etc. 	 This
processor
	
also	 performs functions related to other data
link applications.
4. Avionics, including	 displays,	 keyboard	 input	 devices,
processors, etc., on board DABS equipped aircraft. 	 These
avionics are shared with other DABS surveillance and data
I
link applications.
S. A set of operational procedures and system design charac-
teristics	 which	 determine	 what	 information is sent at
what time and how the pilot	 and	 controller	 access	 the
system.
Figure 1 depicts the proposed ETIS system in a typical installation. 	 A
local processor/display system (LPDS), located at the airport, obtains local
weather observations from automated weather sensor systems. The controller
or airport operator enters certain additional information as required,
including runway and approaches in use and NOTAMS. The y LPDS display, also
installed at the local airport, will, where available, be the Terminal Infor-
mation Processing System (TIPS) display planned for installation in many
*This description of the ETIS concept was abstracted from: Wisleder, Robert
W., May, 1979, ENHANCED TERMINAL INFORMATION SERVICES (ETIS) UTILIZING THE
DISCRETE ADDRESS BEACON SYSTEM (DABS_) DATA LINK CONCEPT DESCRIPTION; Drat
report prepared by Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts
}
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tower crabs during the mid-1980's. TIPS display/input terminal enables the
local controller to access the local ETIS data as well as provide any neces-
sary manual inputs. Also, at most, if not all locations, particularly those
with ATIS today, a digital voice system (DVS) is connected to the LPDS pro-
cessor to provide automatic digitized ETIS voice broadcasts over the VHF
channel currently used for ATIS.
6 At the controlling ATC :.,,acility (which may be co-located at the airport)
the ETIS information is inputted to the AP via a land line and a modem.	 The
AP may have more than one ETIS input, depending upon the number	 of	 airports
within coverage	 of the DABS sensor,	 that have ETIS capability.	 Software in
the AP controls the communication link with the LPDS processor(s),
	
polling it
for data as required and maintaining a table of the most current information.
P	
At this facility, controller access to the ETIS data for each airport	 within
its jurisdiction is provided by the TIPS TRACON Display Subsystem.
When a DABS-equipped aircraft, which is bound for a ETIS-equipped air-
.
port, reaches sa specified area within the coverage of the DABS sensor
(GO-mile radius), the ETIS software in the AP formats a message whose con-
tents are similar to ATIS of today and dispatches it automatically to the
aircraft. As the aircraft proceeds into the terminal area, makes its
approach, and lands, pertinent data are automatically dispatched to the air-
craft by the AP at the appropriate points in the flight and depending upon
the local conditions.	 Such data may include RVR, significant parameter
changes such as altimeter setting, wind shear alert, etc. On a calm, Vitt
day, it is conceivable that the only ETIS message dispatched after the ini-
tial arrival message may be wind on final approach.
In addition to automatic dispatch of ETIS messages, the pilot will have
the option of requesting ETIS information for any suitably equipped airport
at any point in his flight, as long as the aircraft is within coverage of a
DABS sensor. Furthermore, any aircraft whose destination is unknown to the
ground (VFR Right, perhaps) will have to request ETIS, or a means provided
for communicating the aircraft destination to the ground system. This aspect
is discussed in more detail later.
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ETIS messages will be displayed in the cockpit using a variety of data
link displays which depend on the size of the aircraft and sophistication of
avionics that the pilot can afford. Some minimum capability will be required
for the number of alphanumeric characters and/or storage registers of the
display so that the avionics can handle, although perhaps not display at one
time, an entire ETIS message, which includes airport advisories and may be
200 or more characters in length. A CRT or printer type of display provides
the most capability for long messages. Display design will be influenced by
the other services to be provided by the DABS data link, since it is not
likely that any data link service will have a dedicated display (except
perhaps .ATARS).
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